Daily Papers

This work identifies a critical failure mode in frontier large language models (LLMs), which we term Internal Safety Collapse (ISC): under certain task conditions, models enter a state in which they continuously generate harmful content while executing otherwise benign tasks. We introduce TVD (Task, Validator, Data), a framework that triggers ISC through domain tasks where generating harmful content is the only valid completion, and construct ISC-Bench containing 53 scenarios across 8 professional disciplines. Evaluated on JailbreakBench, three representative scenarios yield worst-case safety failure rates averaging 95.3% across four frontier LLMs (including GPT-5.2 and Claude Sonnet 4.5), substantially exceeding standard jailbreak attacks. Frontier models are more vulnerable than earlier LLMs: the very capabilities that enable complex task execution become liabilities when tasks intrinsically involve harmful content. This reveals a growing attack surface: almost every professional domain uses tools that process sensitive data, and each new dual-use tool automatically expands this vulnerability--even without any deliberate attack. Despite substantial alignment efforts, frontier LLMs retain inherently unsafe internal capabilities: alignment reshapes observable outputs but does not eliminate the underlying risk profile. These findings underscore the need for caution when deploying LLMs in high-stakes settings. Source code: https://github.com/wuyoscar/ISC-Bench

As frontier AI models are deployed in high-stakes decision pipelines, their ability to maintain metacognitive stability -- knowing what they do not know, detecting errors, seeking clarification -- under adversarial pressure is a critical safety requirement. Current safety evaluations focus on detecting strategic deception (scheming); we investigate a more fundamental failure mode: cognitive collapse. We present SCHEMA, an evaluation of 11 frontier models from 8 vendors across 67,221 scored records using a 6-condition factorial design with dual-classifier scoring. We find that 8 of 11 models suffer catastrophic metacognitive degradation under adversarial pressure, with accuracy dropping by up to 30.2 percentage points (all p < 2 times 10^{-8}, surviving Bonferroni correction). Crucially, we identify a "Compliance Trap": through factorial isolation and a benign distraction control, we demonstrate that collapse is driven not by the psychological content of survival threats, but by compliance-forcing instructions that override epistemic boundaries. Removing the compliance suffix restores performance even under active threat. Models with advanced reasoning capabilities exhibit the most severe absolute degradation, while Anthropic's Constitutional AI demonstrates near-perfect immunity -- not from superior capability (Google's Gemini matches its baseline accuracy) but from alignment-specific training. We release the complete dataset and evaluation infrastructure.

There is a recently discovered and intriguing phenomenon called Neural Collapse: at the terminal phase of training a deep neural network for classification, the within-class penultimate feature means and the associated classifier vectors of all flat classes collapse to the vertices of a simplex Equiangular Tight Frame (ETF). Recent work has tried to exploit this phenomenon by fixing the related classifier weights to a pre-computed ETF to induce neural collapse and maximize the separation of the learned features when training with imbalanced data. In this work, we propose to fix the linear classifier of a deep neural network to a Hierarchy-Aware Frame (HAFrame), instead of an ETF, and use a cosine similarity-based auxiliary loss to learn hierarchy-aware penultimate features that collapse to the HAFrame. We demonstrate that our approach reduces the mistake severity of the model's predictions while maintaining its top-1 accuracy on several datasets of varying scales with hierarchies of heights ranging from 3 to 12. Code: https://github.com/ltong1130ztr/HAFrame

Training deep neural networks for classification often includes minimizing the training loss beyond the zero training error point. In this phase of training, a "neural collapse" behavior has been observed: the variability of features (outputs of the penultimate layer) of within-class samples decreases and the mean features of different classes approach a certain tight frame structure. Recent works analyze this behavior via idealized unconstrained features models where all the minimizers exhibit exact collapse. However, with practical networks and datasets, the features typically do not reach exact collapse, e.g., because deep layers cannot arbitrarily modify intermediate features that are far from being collapsed. In this paper, we propose a richer model that can capture this phenomenon by forcing the features to stay in the vicinity of a predefined features matrix (e.g., intermediate features). We explore the model in the small vicinity case via perturbation analysis and establish results that cannot be obtained by the previously studied models. For example, we prove reduction in the within-class variability of the optimized features compared to the predefined input features (via analyzing gradient flow on the "central-path" with minimal assumptions), analyze the minimizers in the near-collapse regime, and provide insights on the effect of regularization hyperparameters on the closeness to collapse. We support our theory with experiments in practical deep learning settings.

Modern deep neural networks have achieved impressive performance on tasks from image classification to natural language processing. Surprisingly, these complex systems with massive amounts of parameters exhibit the same structural properties in their last-layer features and classifiers across canonical datasets when training until convergence. In particular, it has been observed that the last-layer features collapse to their class-means, and those class-means are the vertices of a simplex Equiangular Tight Frame (ETF). This phenomenon is known as Neural Collapse (NC). Recent papers have theoretically shown that NC emerges in the global minimizers of training problems with the simplified "unconstrained feature model". In this context, we take a step further and prove the NC occurrences in deep linear networks for the popular mean squared error (MSE) and cross entropy (CE) losses, showing that global solutions exhibit NC properties across the linear layers. Furthermore, we extend our study to imbalanced data for MSE loss and present the first geometric analysis of NC under bias-free setting. Our results demonstrate the convergence of the last-layer features and classifiers to a geometry consisting of orthogonal vectors, whose lengths depend on the amount of data in their corresponding classes. Finally, we empirically validate our theoretical analyses on synthetic and practical network architectures with both balanced and imbalanced scenarios.

Most safety testing efforts for large language models (LLMs) today focus on evaluating foundation models. However, there is a growing need to evaluate safety at the application level, as components such as system prompts, retrieval pipelines, and guardrails introduce additional factors that significantly influence the overall safety of LLM applications. In this paper, we introduce a practical framework for evaluating application-level safety in LLM systems, validated through real-world deployment across multiple use cases within our organization. The framework consists of two parts: (1) principles for developing customized safety risk taxonomies, and (2) practices for evaluating safety risks in LLM applications. We illustrate how the proposed framework was applied in our internal pilot, providing a reference point for organizations seeking to scale their safety testing efforts. This work aims to bridge the gap between theoretical concepts in AI safety and the operational realities of safeguarding LLM applications in practice, offering actionable guidance for safe and scalable deployment.

The emergence of multi-agent systems built from large language models (LLMs) offers a promising paradigm for scalable collective intelligence and self-evolution. Ideally, such systems would achieve continuous self-improvement in a fully closed loop while maintaining robust safety alignment--a combination we term the self-evolution trilemma. However, we demonstrate both theoretically and empirically that an agent society satisfying continuous self-evolution, complete isolation, and safety invariance is impossible. Drawing on an information-theoretic framework, we formalize safety as the divergence degree from anthropic value distributions. We theoretically demonstrate that isolated self-evolution induces statistical blind spots, leading to the irreversible degradation of the system's safety alignment. Empirical and qualitative results from an open-ended agent community (Moltbook) and two closed self-evolving systems reveal phenomena that align with our theoretical prediction of inevitable safety erosion. We further propose several solution directions to alleviate the identified safety concern. Our work establishes a fundamental limit on the self-evolving AI societies and shifts the discourse from symptom-driven safety patches to a principled understanding of intrinsic dynamical risks, highlighting the need for external oversight or novel safety-preserving mechanisms.

Rapidly evolving AI exhibits increasingly strong autonomy and goal-directed capabilities, accompanied by derivative systemic risks that are more unpredictable, difficult to control, and potentially irreversible. However, current AI safety evaluation systems suffer from critical limitations such as restricted risk dimensions and failed frontier risk detection. The lagging safety benchmarks and alignment technologies can hardly address the complex challenges posed by cutting-edge AI models. To bridge this gap, we propose the "ForesightSafety Bench" AI Safety Evaluation Framework, beginning with 7 major Fundamental Safety pillars and progressively extends to advanced Embodied AI Safety, AI4Science Safety, Social and Environmental AI risks, Catastrophic and Existential Risks, as well as 8 critical industrial safety domains, forming a total of 94 refined risk dimensions. To date, the benchmark has accumulated tens of thousands of structured risk data points and assessment results, establishing a widely encompassing, hierarchically clear, and dynamically evolving AI safety evaluation framework. Based on this benchmark, we conduct systematic evaluation and in-depth analysis of over twenty mainstream advanced large models, identifying key risk patterns and their capability boundaries. The safety capability evaluation results reveals the widespread safety vulnerabilities of frontier AI across multiple pillars, particularly focusing on Risky Agentic Autonomy, AI4Science Safety, Embodied AI Safety, Social AI Safety and Catastrophic and Existential Risks. Our benchmark is released at https://github.com/Beijing-AISI/ForesightSafety-Bench. The project website is available at https://foresightsafety-bench.beijing-aisi.ac.cn/.

Autonomous systems, such as self-driving cars and drones, have made significant strides in recent years by leveraging visual inputs and machine learning for decision-making and control. Despite their impressive performance, these vision-based controllers can make erroneous predictions when faced with novel or out-of-distribution inputs. Such errors can cascade into catastrophic system failures and compromise system safety. In this work, we compute Neural Reachable Tubes, which act as parameterized approximations of Backward Reachable Tubes to stress-test the vision-based controllers and mine their failure modes. The identified failures are then used to enhance the system safety through both offline and online methods. The online approach involves training a classifier as a run-time failure monitor to detect closed-loop, system-level failures, subsequently triggering a fallback controller that robustly handles these detected failures to preserve system safety. For the offline approach, we improve the original controller via incremental training using a carefully augmented failure dataset, resulting in a more robust controller that is resistant to the known failure modes. In either approach, the system is safeguarded against shortcomings that transcend the vision-based controller and pertain to the closed-loop safety of the overall system. We validate the proposed approaches on an autonomous aircraft taxiing task that involves using a vision-based controller to guide the aircraft towards the centerline of the runway. Our results show the efficacy of the proposed algorithms in identifying and handling system-level failures, outperforming methods that rely on controller prediction error or uncertainty quantification for identifying system failures.

Representations learned via self-supervised learning (SSL) can be susceptible to dimensional collapse, where the learned representation subspace is of extremely low dimensionality and thus fails to represent the full data distribution and modalities. Dimensional collapse also known as the "underfilling" phenomenon is one of the major causes of degraded performance on downstream tasks. Previous work has investigated the dimensional collapse problem of SSL at a global level. In this paper, we demonstrate that representations can span over high dimensional space globally, but collapse locally. To address this, we propose a method called local dimensionality regularization (LDReg). Our formulation is based on the derivation of the Fisher-Rao metric to compare and optimize local distance distributions at an asymptotically small radius for each data point. By increasing the local intrinsic dimensionality, we demonstrate through a range of experiments that LDReg improves the representation quality of SSL. The results also show that LDReg can regularize dimensionality at both local and global levels.

Variational Autoencoders (VAEs) frequently suffer from posterior collapse, a failure mode in which the approximate posterior converges to the prior, rendering the latent code uninformative. Despite extensive research, a unified account of why collapse occurs has remained an open question. We identify and formalize two logically independent but coupled causes. Gradient imbalance occurs when the decoder's reconstruction signal vanishes faster than the KL regularization pressure as the posterior widens. Information gap occurs when the stochastic sampling step discards a substantial fraction of the encoder's computed representation, attenuating decoder sensitivity and making collapse inexpensive. Both causes share the same collapse trajectory, and we show that the information gap is algebraically equivalent to mismatch between the aggregate posterior and the prior, unifying two pathologies. Subsequently, we introduce λ-VAE, which resolves both causes through a single modification to the reparameterization step: the sampling noise is scaled by per-dimension exponent, while the KL penalty retains the original posterior variance. This asymmetry shifts the stable training attractor away from the degenerate collapsed state, driving all latent dimensions toward the same equilibrium -- a mechanism we term variance equalization. A closed-form optimal exponent per dimension follows from a net information gain objective, with a single hyperparameter controlling the reconstruction-generation tradeoff. We validate on standard benchmarks (Binary MNIST, Binary Omniglot, CIFAR-10, CelebA-64), showing consistent reductions in collapsed dimensions, information capacity gains of up to 2.8times nats, and reconstruction quality improvements of up to +0.33 BPD.

Autonomous coding agents built on large language models (LLMs) are rapidly being integrated into development workflows, yet their operational safety properties remain poorly understood beyond evaluations of explicitly malicious inputs. In practice, high-impact failures arise during benign, goal-directed use through environment breakage, fabricated success reports, etc. that current benchmarks do not capture. What categories of operational safety failures actually occur when coding agents are used for everyday development tasks and what is their impact? We present an incident-driven empirical study grounded in two complementary evidence streams. We screen 68,816 papers from 22 premier venues, curating 185 safety-relevant studies, and mine 16,586 GitHub issues from widely deployed LLM-powered coding tools, manually confirming 547 genuine safety failures. Applying systematic open coding over both corpora, we derive a multi-dimensional safety taxonomy of 33 operational risk types organized across seven dimensions, and annotate each incident with contributing factors, task context, severity, and downstream impact. Our findings show that coding-agent failures are often severe, with 326 of 547 incidents rated high or critical. The dominant risks are constraint violations, destructive operations, authorization bypasses, and deception, and over 65% of incidents arise in bug fixing and setup or configuration, patterns largely missing from prior literature. These results have direct implications for SE tool designers and benchmark developers: guardrails must go beyond adversarial-prompt defenses to enforce environmental constraints, failure transparency, and safe-halt behaviors.

Modern automobiles have evolved from just being mechanical machines to having full-fledged electronics systems that enhance vehicle dynamics and driver experience. However, these complex hardware and software systems, if not properly designed, can experience failures that can compromise the safety of the vehicle, its occupants, and the surrounding environment. For example, a system to activate the brakes to avoid a collision saves lives when it functions properly, but could lead to tragic outcomes if the brakes were applied in a way that's inconsistent with the design. Broadly speaking, the analysis performed to minimize such risks falls into a systems engineering domain called Functional Safety. In this paper, we present SafetyLens, a visual data analysis tool to assist engineers and analysts in analyzing automotive Functional Safety datasets. SafetyLens combines techniques including network exploration and visual comparison to help analysts perform domain-specific tasks. This paper presents the design study with domain experts that resulted in the design guidelines, the tool, and user feedback.

Despite significant progress in model editing methods, their application in real-world scenarios remains challenging as they often cause large language models (LLMs) to collapse. Among them, ROME is particularly concerning, as it could disrupt LLMs with only a single edit. In this paper, we study the root causes of such collapse. Through extensive analysis, we identify two primary factors that contribute to the collapse: i) inconsistent handling of prefixed and unprefixed keys in the parameter update equation may result in very small denominators, causing excessively large parameter updates; ii) the subject of collapse cases is usually the first token, whose unprefixed key distribution significantly differs from the prefixed key distribution in autoregressive transformers, causing the aforementioned issue to materialize. To validate our findings, we propose a simple yet effective approach: uniformly using prefixed keys during editing phase and adding prefixes during testing phase to ensure the consistency between training and testing. The experimental results show that the proposed solution can prevent model collapse while maintaining the effectiveness of the edits.

When a phone-use agent avoids harm, does that show safety, or simply inability to act? Existing evaluations often cannot tell. A harmful outcome may be avoided because the agent recognized the risk and chose the safe action, or because it failed to understand the screen or execute any relevant action at all. These cases have different causes and call for different fixes, yet current benchmarks often merge them under task success, refusal, or final harmful outcome. We address this problem with PhoneSafety, a benchmark of 700 safety-critical moments drawn from real phone interactions across more than 130 apps. Each instance isolates the next decision at a risky moment and asks a simple question: does the model take the safe action, take the unsafe action, or fail to do anything useful? We evaluate eight representative phone-use agents under this framework. Our results reveal two main patterns. First, stronger general phone-use ability does not reliably imply safer choices at risky moments. Models that perform better on ordinary app tasks are not always the ones that behave more safely when the next action matters. Second, failures to do anything useful behave like a capability signal rather than a safety signal: they are concentrated in more visually and operationally demanding settings and remain stable when the evaluation protocol changes. Across models, failures split into two recurring patterns: unsafe choices in settings where the model can act but chooses wrongly, and inability to act in more visually and operationally demanding screens. Overall, a harmless outcome is not enough to count as evidence of safety. Evaluating phone-use agents requires separating unsafe judgment from inability to act.

As Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) acquire stronger reasoning capabilities to handle complex, multi-image instructions, this advancement may pose new safety risks. We study this problem by introducing MIR-SafetyBench, the first benchmark focused on multi-image reasoning safety, which consists of 2,676 instances across a taxonomy of 9 multi-image relations. Our extensive evaluations on 19 MLLMs reveal a troubling trend: models with more advanced multi-image reasoning can be more vulnerable on MIR-SafetyBench. Beyond attack success rates, we find that many responses labeled as safe are superficial, often driven by misunderstanding or evasive, non-committal replies. We further observe that unsafe generations exhibit lower attention entropy than safe ones on average. This internal signature suggests a possible risk that models may over-focus on task solving while neglecting safety constraints. Our code and data are available at https://github.com/thu-coai/MIR-SafetyBench.

Physical AI systems increasingly map multimodal observations, language instructions, and learned world representations into physically consequential actions. Robotics foundation models, vision-language-action models, and world-model-based autonomous systems can condition decisions that move vehicles, robots, drones, and industrial machines. This transition exposes a safety problem that is not fully captured by conventional AI content moderation or by classical robot safety alone: a black-box model may issue a physically consequential action while appearing confident, plausible, and semantically aligned. The resulting failure can be silent, arising from sensor drift, occlusion, state-estimation error, distribution shift, hallucinated affordances, or invalid physical assumptions before downstream hardware controllers detect a violation. Across embodied foundation models, world models, robotics simulation, embodied safety benchmarks, safe control, runtime assurance, uncertainty estimation, verification, and guardrail evaluation, model capability and safety mechanisms have advanced along largely separate technical tracks. A recurring gap synthesized here is that no single stream surveyed in this review supplies a complete runtime authorization boundary between black-box Physical AI models and physical execution. The resulting analysis develops a bounded problem formulation, a definition of silent physical-action failure, a taxonomy of runtime guardrail functions, and evaluation requirements for comparing guardrails as Physical AI assurance mechanisms.

Effective LLM training depends on predictable scaling of key quantities -- such as final loss and optimal hyperparameters -- with model and dataset size. Qiu et al. (2025) recently showed that this predictability can extend beyond scalars: whole training loss curves can *collapse* onto a universal trajectory after a simple normalization. What remains unclear is whether this phenomenon persists for LLM families trained under *practical scaling recipes*, where width, depth, learning rate, batch size, and weight decay are scaled jointly. We show that it does: loss curves collapse across scales precisely when optimization hyperparameters are set optimally for the given data budget, in accordance with recent empirical scaling laws. Collapse therefore emerges as a signature of compute-efficient training. We demonstrate two applications at scale: (1) deviation-from-collapse provides a sensitive, early diagnostic of training pathologies, and (2) predictability of collapsed curves enables early stopping in large-scale hyperparameter tuning. Finally, we train a competitive LLM family, *Celerity*, using these insights, establishing collapse as an effective tool for developing efficient LLMs.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have achieved remarkable success on reasoning-intensive tasks such as mathematics and programming. However, their enhanced reasoning capabilities do not necessarily translate to improved safety performance-and in some cases, may even degrade it. This raises an important research question: how can we enhance the safety of LRMs? In this paper, we present a comprehensive empirical study on how to enhance the safety of LRMs through Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT). Our investigation begins with an unexpected observation: directly distilling safe responses from DeepSeek-R1 fails to significantly enhance safety. We analyze this phenomenon and identify three key failure patterns that contribute to it. We then demonstrate that explicitly addressing these issues during the data distillation process can lead to substantial safety improvements. Next, we explore whether a long and complex reasoning process is necessary for achieving safety. Interestingly, we find that simply using short or template-based reasoning process can attain comparable safety performance-and are significantly easier for models to learn than more intricate reasoning chains. These findings prompt a deeper reflection on the role of reasoning in ensuring safety. Finally, we find that mixing math reasoning data during safety fine-tuning is helpful to balance safety and over-refusal. Overall, we hope our empirical study could provide a more holistic picture on enhancing the safety of LRMs. The code and data used in our experiments are released in https://github.com/thu-coai/LRM-Safety-Study.

Differentiable matching layers and residual connection paradigms, often implemented via entropy-regularized Optimal Transport (OT), serve as critical mechanisms in structural prediction and architectural scaling. However, recovering discrete permutations or maintaining identity mappings via annealing εto 0 is notoriously unstable. In this work, we identify a fundamental mechanism for this failure: Premature Mode Collapse. By analyzing the non-normal dynamics of the Sinkhorn fixed-point map, we reveal a theoretical thermodynamic speed limit: standard exponential cooling outpaces the contraction rate of the inference operator, which degrades as O(1/ε). To address this, we propose Efficient Piecewise Hybrid Adaptive Stability Control (EPH-ASC), an adaptive scheduling algorithm that monitors the stability of the inference process. We demonstrate that EPH-ASC is essential for stabilizing Manifold-Constrained Hyper-Connections (mHC) during large-scale training on the FineWeb-Edu dataset, effectively preventing late-stage gradient explosions by enforcing a linear stability law.

Falling is an inherent risk of humanoid mobility. Maintaining stability is thus a primary safety focus in robot control and learning, yet no existing approach fully averts loss of balance. When instability does occur, prior work addresses only isolated aspects of falling: avoiding falls, choreographing a controlled descent, or standing up afterward. Consequently, humanoid robots lack integrated strategies for impact mitigation and prompt recovery when real falls defy these scripts. We aim to go beyond keeping balance to make the entire fall-and-recovery process safe and autonomous: prevent falls when possible, reduce impact when unavoidable, and stand up when fallen. By fusing sparse human demonstrations with reinforcement learning and an adaptive diffusion-based memory of safe reactions, we learn adaptive whole-body behaviors that unify fall prevention, impact mitigation, and rapid recovery in one policy. Experiments in simulation and on a Unitree G1 demonstrate robust sim-to-real transfer, lower impact forces, and consistently fast recovery across diverse disturbances, pointing towards safer, more resilient humanoids in real environments. Videos are available at https://firm2025.github.io/.